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AFIT-ENV-12-D-01 
Abstract 
 
 Full knowledge of a customer’s true unmet need should improve the likelihood of 
providing that customer with an option that meets the need.  Since there is inherent risk in 
making any change, that customer will be more likely to accept the risk the more they 
understand the option.  Both the customer and the solution provider possess knowledge 
that the other needs, knowledge which is often highly contextual and difficult to transfer, 
and thus a sufficiently close relationship between the customer and the solution provider 
should improve this knowledge transfer.  It is, however, exceedingly difficult to measure 
this relationship, or the level of understanding achieved, and its impact on the adoption of 
an innovative solution due the wide range of conditions under which change takes place.  
There is a concern that involving the customer will tend to lead to more constraints and 
desires being expressed by the customer.  Projects conducted under the U.S. Air Force 
Core Process Three (CP-3) program, which share a number of common traits, served as 
the basis for this research in isolating the effect of customer engagement on innovation 
adoption.  Technologists in CP-3 projects were surveyed for their assessments of 
customer engagement, their own understanding of the customer’s true need, and the risk 
they felt the customer was willing to accept. This research showed that customer 
engagement does lead to an increase in the understanding of the need and, further, that 
higher levels of engagement lead to a convergent customer “voice” that does not result in 
an increase in customer requirements. 
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THE ROLE OF CUSTOMER ENGAGEMENT IN INNOVATION ADOPTION 
 
I. Introduction 
 
To innovate is to change, but change is rarely easy, even when the case is 
compelling.  To abandon the status quo means recognizing that some other option will 
provide an improvement and believing that the improvement will justify the cost of 
change.  Developing those options – that is, providing a solution to a customer’s need – is 
the function of every business.  The customer must of course be aware that the option 
exists and that it may be improved through a better understanding of the true nature of the 
need.  Therefore, involving the customer in the solution development process should 
logically lead to increased awareness of options, improved solutions, and increased 
adoption rates.  The effect, unfortunately, is difficult to assess since solution development 
and adoption often take place under a vast range of conditions, thereby making direct 
measures of any aspect of the process problematic at best. 
Under the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Core Process 3 (CP-3) 
program, customers and technologists are brought together for short-term projects, to 
address documented and important needs, under relatively standard conditions.  This 
presents an ideal opportunity to characterize a number of specific factors related to the 
problem-solution process.  This research specifically investigated (1) the relationship 
between the level of interaction with the customer and how well the problem is 
understood by the project team and (2) the propensity of the customer to accept the 
option developed by the team. 
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Background 
Innovation means change 
Innovation has been defined as invention plus exploitation (Roberts, 1988).  
Something can be technologically groundbreaking, but unless and until it is employed by 
some end-user to meet a previously unmet need – i.e., it is exploited – it is nothing more 
than technology “on the shelf.”  The need remains unmet and the potential unrealized.  
There is nothing particularly new or modern about the concept.  An individual or a group 
recognizes, develops, and implements an adaptation to differentiate them from other 
groups.  If this differentiation confers a competitive advantage, the individual or group is 
more likely to be successful.  In the natural world, the species reproduces; in the business 
world, the firm persists.  For example, stone tools set apart Homo habilis from his 
contemporaries and Wal-Mart’s logistics model enabled it to vault over every other 
retailer in the world. 
In the natural world, any adaptation is the result of chance, and the individual is 
left to play the hand they are dealt.  In contrast, a conscious act of change is required in 
the business world if any adaptation is to be exploited.  It is more than simply awareness 
of the need to change and is more than even the act of making a decision, since deciding 
not to change is likely an option.  A potential innovation “customer” can be considered to 
be an individual or group with some unmet need that also is willing to consider a change 
in order to address that need.  When considering the necessary change, this customer 
must be sufficiently convinced that the change will be worth the cost. 
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Some customers change, some do not 
Firms may actively seek to innovate as a means to create value in ways that are 
either more efficient than other firms or differentiates them from competing firms.  As 
such, innovation becomes a means of tilting the playing field.  This advantage may be 
realized by adopting some change in behavior, utilizing some object which provides 
physical leverage, or perhaps nothing more than making some observation that improves 
the ability to predict the future.  The customer might methodically investigate the 
problem and possible solutions or may simply stumble upon a promising adaptation. 
The adaptation presents some value proposition for the potential adopter, thereby 
promising a competitive advantage or merely survival.  As a forecast of some possible 
future condition, however, that value proposition contains some degree of uncertainty 
and, therefore, must be compelling if it is to convince the customer to change.  In short, 
moving from simply being aware of a potential solution to making the conscious decision 
to adopt that approach requires some leap of faith. 
Some options are accepted, some are not 
The system in use by the customer at some earlier time likely had a level of 
performance superior to that of competitors’ systems, which provided the firm with a 
competitive advantage where there had previously been a level playing field.  However, 
the superior performance of that system naturally leads to competitors either dying out, 
adopting the same or similar systems, or developing some innovative approach of their 
own.  In any case, this eventually leads to a reduction or outright elimination of the 
original competitive advantage, and the playing field is again level, if not tilted against 
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the firm.  This relative lack of performance exhibited by the incumbent system then 
becomes a new “need” necessitating a solution. 
There may be some performance margin available to be exploited within the 
incumbent system by making small changes in operation, materials, timing, etc.  As time 
goes on, however, incremental changes to the existing system become less simple and 
less cost-effective.  With a reduced performance margin available to exploit, viable 
solutions will increasingly involve the use of some entirely new system or approach.  
This is classic “radical” or discontinuous innovation described by Foster (1986).  Being a 
new system or approach, however, the user will be to some degree less familiar with it.  
Likewise, the manufacturer or supplier of products not previously used in that arena will 
likely be unfamiliar with the true needs of these prospective new users and may not know 
these potential customers even exist.  Any efforts to bring these two parties together, in 
order to increase awareness of the other’s perspectives and experiences, should be of 
considerable benefit to both parties. 
There are two general models by which these perspectives are shared.  In the 
“requirements pull” model, the customer acknowledges the aspect of their environment is 
in need of improvement, generally in performance or efficiency, and investigates the 
available options.  In contrast, under the “technology push” model, some invention vies 
for the attention of prospective adopters in the open marketplace.  To become a true 
innovation, such novel ideas must actually be exploited.  Very few inventions would ever 
be considered successes under this metric.  The United States (U.S.) Patent and Trade 
Office issued 224,505 patents in calendar year 2011 (USPTO, 2012).  In rough terms, 
there is one idea patented every two and a half minutes.  Yet there are estimates that as 
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many as 95% of all patented technologies will never become a marketable product or 
process (Chesbrough, 2011).   
Engaging the customer to influence change 
It is ultimately the user who makes the choice whether or not to adopt a given 
innovation.  A primary indicator of whether or not the user will make the required leap of 
faith will be the level of uncertainty regarding the ability of the proposed solution to 
provide the needed performance (Rogers, 2003).  This is of course highly subjective, and 
in general it would be expected that the likelihood of adopting a proposed solution will 
increase as the user’s familiarity with the proposed innovation increases.  In incremental 
innovation, where the user will be relatively comfortable with the technology and likely 
have a good appreciation for the risks and rewards involved in adopting it, the decision to 
adopt is more straightforward.  However, the user may be able to quantify the cost of 
change and the benefit received to a reasonable degree of confidence.  The decision to 
adopt a discontinuous innovation, which will have much more uncertainty on both sides 
of the ledger, may leave the user much less confident that the benefit will be worth the 
cost. 
The user of any product or process is often well positioned to innovate.  In fact, 
users have been shown to be very successful innovators in a wide range of fields 
(Schreier and Prugl, 2008; von Hippel, 1976; Morrison et al., 2000; Franke and Shaw, 
2003).  Users possess tacit knowledge – knowledge that cannot easily be codified – of the 
operational environment, the shortcomings of the system in use, and trends that may 
potentially alter the competitive landscape (von Hippel, 1986, 2005).  Faced with a lack 
of alternatives, such a user may be highly motivated to physically alter the system or use 
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the system in a manner not originally intended by the manufacturer in order to regain a 
competitive advantage. 
There is widespread agreement that customer awareness is an important predictor 
of new product success (Cooper, 1979; Maidique and Zirger, 1984; van der Panne et al., 
2003).  Actively soliciting user feedback has been shown to increase customer 
satisfaction (Esteves, 2003), but simple market research often does no more than justify 
the direction already taken by the firm (Enkel et al., 2005).  Solving problems frequently 
involves anticipating patterns based on existing knowledge and leaping ahead to the 
answer without a thorough understanding of the problem (Reusser, 1988). 
In many instances, firms think they know their customers, and customers think 
they know their options.  The customer acknowledges some unmet need and is willing to 
consider change.  The technologist may have a lower-level understanding of the true 
nature of the specific need but a higher-level understanding of the performance 
limitations of other systems.   Bringing the two parties together should improve the 
ability of each to more fully communicate their tacit knowledge to each other. 
Engaging the customer may have other consequences, however.  As the level of 
engagement is increased, the technologist may well find that the customer develops a 
more divergent “voice,” whereby the customer need becomes less clear; extraneous 
details may be brought to light and erroneous information may be more likely to be 
introduced into the discussions.  The customer may be more apt to dwell on exceptions 
and unusual situations than routine operations. 
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Isolating factors that influence change 
Characterizing any facet of the innovation process and its impact on adoption is 
problematic due to a wide variation in the environments under which innovations take 
place.  Innovations emerge under a wide variety of business climates and a great deal of 
uncertainty.  For this reason, there is no standard “timetable” or formula by which an 
adaptation will either succeed or fail in propagating itself in the general population.  
Novel ideas that succeed can take decades to take hold, or they can “go viral” in very 
short order. 
Innovations are by their very nature unique events, which are the result of a wide 
variety of boundary conditions and variables.  Studying the adoption of a given 
adaptation is complicated by the wide variation in scope, switching costs, and even 
societal norms involved in bringing about changes in behavior.  The conditions are never 
the same in any two cases.  This makes the study of innovation adoption uniquely 
challenging. 
The literature tends to look at “success stories,” and while characterizing the 
variables in these cases may indeed prove useful, such analyses may lead to identifying 
characteristics common to success and failure alike (van de Ven, 1986).  For example, a 
firm successful at innovating may have an organizational climate that is supportive of 
creativity, but so might an unsuccessful firm.  Such characteristics may very well 
represent a “necessary but insufficient” condition and be viewed at best as prerequisites 
for success and not differentiators. 
There are also political and other factors totally unrelated to the technology that 
often influence whether or not a specific solution is adopted.  Anecdotal evidence 
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abounds of weapon system development programs in the militaries of the U.S. and other 
countries swayed by parties not familiar with the details of either the technology or the 
operational environment.  In such cases, the end result can be almost totally unrelated to 
the adequacy of the proposed solution in meeting the need of the customer. 
Information flow can widely vary.  In many industries, trade secrets may be so 
highly valued that all related information is purposely kept away from customers under 
the fear of disclosure to rival firms.  In the military, information on threats and specific 
weapon vulnerabilities may often be classified and therefore not available to all parties.  
In general, a lack of complete and unconstrained access to all the relevant information 
will impact the ultimate decision. 
Core Process Three (CP-3) 
Genetic research involves the comparison of physiological characteristics 
separated by generations.  Use of the common Fruit Fly, Drosophila melanogaster, in 
genetic research dates to the famous “Fly Room” at Columbia University in 1910 where, 
despite their obvious limitations as proxies for humans, they were found to be easy and 
inexpensive to care for and bred quickly.  Similarly, Christensen (1997) was successful in 
isolating business adaptations through the study of the computer hard disk drive industry 
and states that “if you want to understand why something happens in business, study the 
disk drive industry.  Those companies are the closest things to fruit flies that the business 
world will ever see."  Adequately characterizing innovation adoption requires a sample 
population as controllable as the fruit fly is in genetic research. 
There are no fewer than 34 initiatives in the Department of Defense that address 
“urgent warfighter needs.”  Among those is the AFRL Enterprise Core Process Three 
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(CP-3).  Under this initiative, projects are set up to focus science and technology efforts 
in an attempt to accelerate development and demonstration of technology that addresses 
near-term warfighter needs (AFLRI 90-104, 2010).  These initiatives are constrained in 
time and involve both users and technologists in the development of a solution to the 
stated need. 
Focusing on CP-3 projects in the study of the adoption of innovation offers 
advantages akin to those of fruit flies in genetics and disk drives in business.  First, all 
CP-3 projects are similar in scope.  Their costs are relatively small and their timelines are 
very consistent, especially when compared to the general population of innovation 
stories.  Second, CP-3 projects involve motivated users.  These projects are established to 
address identified “urgent warfighter needs,” which are top priorities of the Air Force 
members in the field.  Therefore, these needs have been vetted, prioritized, analyzed, and 
briefed at high levels in the services.  They are not gee-whiz, nice-to-have gadgets or 
some other “toy” representing the latest fashionable buzzword.  Lastly, CP-3 projects 
focus on problems that have avoided conventional solutions.  Therefore, it can be safely 
assumed that the potential for improvement through incremental, sustaining innovation 
has been nearly exhausted.  This implies that any solution to the need must lie outside the 
status quo and that a radical innovation is the only way forward.  This drives a need to 
involve both users and technologists working together in an environment that will 
facilitate the exchange of tacit information in order to reduce uncertainty. 
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Problem Statement 
 It is exceedingly difficult to measure customer involvement and assess its impact 
on adoption in the innovation process.  Involving a motivated customer in the solution 
development process should increase the propensity of that customer to adopt a solution 
other than an incremental improvement to the current system, however, evidence as to 
whether or not this necessarily takes place has not as yet been clearly demonstrated.  
Characterizing the salient aspects of customer involvement should confirm the existence 
of any links between the level of understanding of the user’s need attained by the 
technologist and whether there is any impact on the user’s acceptance of a solution option 
which the user was unable to identify and/or develop on their own. 
 
Research Questions 
The exchange of tacit information is important to both enhancing the 
technologist’s understanding of the user’s true need (whether articulated or unarticulated) 
and the user’s understanding of the possibilities and limits of novel technological 
approaches.  Under CP-3, technologists and users interact, which should facilitate this 
exchange of information.  Furthermore, these projects are accomplished under a 
consistently repeated structure.  By defining the following constructs, the efficacy of this 
interaction can be assessed. 
1. Customer engagement: the technologist’s assessment of the degree to which the 
customer was involved during the CP-3 project. 
 
2. Customer unity of voice: the technologist’s assessment of the consistency of the 
feedback provided by the customer. 
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3. Problem understanding: the technologist’s assessment of how well they 
appreciated the needs of the user. 
 
4. Confidence in solution: the technologist’s assessment of their own confidence 
that the option or options provided would adequately meet the user’s need. 
 
5. Level of innovation: the technologist’s assessment of the nature of the option 
proposed to the user by the technologists as a departure from the incumbent 
system or approach, i.e., how large of a “leap of faith” was required to accept the 
proposed solution option.  
 
Through the measurement of these five constructs, relationships can be assessed in order 
to identify the specific observed effects within the CP-3 projects.  The following 
investigative areas were identified. 
1. Does an increase in customer involvement within a CP-3 project result in an 
increase in the technologist’s understanding of the customer’s need? 
 
2. Does in increase in customer involvement within a CP-3 project result in a more 
divergent customer “voice?” 
 
3. Does a more divergent customer “voice” within a CP-3 project result in a 
decrease in the technologist’s understanding of the customer’s need? 
 
4. Does an increase in the technologist’s perceived understanding of the customer’s 
need within a CP-3 project result in an increase in confidence of the solution 
option’s ability to adequately meet the user’s need?  
 
5. Does a more divergent customer “voice” within a CP-3 project result in a 
decrease in confidence of the solution option’s ability to adequately meet the 
user’s need? 
 
6. What are in effects of customer involvement, convergence/divergence of 
customer “voice,” understanding of user need, and confidence in the solution on 
the level of technical change proposed and accepted by the customer within a CP-
3 project? 
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Methodology 
This research is focused on the 18 CP-3 projects that have been completed to date 
by AFRL.  These relatively consistently structured projects present an opportunity to 
characterize the involvement of users and inventors working toward a common goal and 
assess the degree of agreement among members of the team.  To that end, a questionnaire 
was prepared for the technologists to assess the five constructs defined above.  The 
working relationship between the technologist and the end-user was analyzed to 
determine the degree to which the measured characteristics of that relationship influence 
the acceptance of a solution to a stated problem.  Specifically, measures of customer 
engagement and the degree to which the customer’s voice was unified were correlated 
with measures of problem understanding and level of innovation. 
 
Assumptions and Limitations 
 All CP-3 projects require validated, documented user need.  The user, familiar 
with the incumbent technology, has therefore previously assessed incremental 
innovations and found it lacking.  It was assumed, therefore, that the user was sufficiently 
motivated and that the technological solution(s) investigated were radical as opposed to 
incremental.  Furthermore, no attempts were made to judge the wisdom of the user’s 
eventual decision. 
 The CP-3 program has only been in existence for a few years, with only two or 
three projects approved per year.  Finding the participants involved a fair amount of 
legwork, and some participants could understandably not be found or were otherwise 
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unavailable to be interviewed.  Overall, a reasonable number of participants were 
ultimately contacted and agreed to participate in this research. 
 It should be noted at this point that no attempt was made to measure the eventual 
adoption or diffusion of any innovation.  Within the firm, priorities must compete for the 
scarce resources needed to field a new system or modify a fielded system.  Far too many 
variables unrelated to the other merits of the project are involved, and as these are 
relatively recent efforts, some may not have had enough time to be fielded. 
Finally, this research is not in any way intended to be an evaluation or assessment 
of the CP-3 program overall or any specific project under the CP-3 framework.  The 
projects were investigated in aggregate from the perspective of their unique and relatively 
consistent program structure, which provided a means to control for other variables.  The 
goal was to characterize customer engagement on as normalized of a scale as possible.  
Case studies of any individual CP-3 projects were therefore not attempted. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
In defining a customer as the individual or group with some acknowledged unmet 
need who is willing to consider change to meet that need, this research is primarily 
interested in those factors which influence the ultimate decision of whether or not to 
change.  The following is presented as a summary the more germane aspects of adoption 
models, which consider only a single decision, rather than diffusion models, which view 
patterns of adoption through many users (Frambach and Schillewaert, 1999).  Topics 
addressed include the advantages and implications of direct customer involvement in the 
need-solution process, the factors that influence the motivation to innovate (i.e., the “leap 
of faith” necessary to abandon the status quo), methods of characterizing customer 
engagement, and the process of bringing customers and solution providers together.  
 
Why, when, and how customers interact with solution providers 
The importance of customer awareness to firm success is well represented in the 
literature.  Simply spending increasing amounts of the firm’s resources on research and 
development (R&D) is far from a guarantee of increasing profitability; the very act of 
measuring and rewarding internal research will tend to encourage the allocation of 
resources to internal ideas, thereby resulting in an increase in the size of the research arm 
of the firm without necessarily improving innovation performance (Hauser and 
Zettelmeyer, 1996).  A strong customer focus within and through the firm is often a 
competitive advantage in and of itself (Hendard and Szymanski, 2001; van der Panne et 
al., 2003).  Further, relying only on internal market research does little more than confirm 
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existing biases and does not typically reveal latent, unarticulated customer needs (Enkel 
et al., 2005). 
In the traditional view of the firm, the only role that a customer has to play in the 
innovation process is to have a need.  The manufacturer’s responsibility is to identify and 
fill that need by producing a new product or improving an existing product (von Hippel, 
2005).  However, soliciting feedback from users at points during the new product 
development process has been shown to be beneficial to success (Rollins and Halinen, 
2005; Lettl, 2007; Esteves, 2003). 
Specialized knowledge is a key strategic resource of the firm; more to the point, 
information asymmetries are exploited by successful firms.  Having acquired knowledge 
which may lead to a competitive advantage, the firm will in most cases put safeguards in 
place, perhaps through patents or otherwise protecting it as a trade secret, in order to keep 
that knowledge from being transferred to anyone outside, and often within, the firm.  This 
is not a universal approach, as there are sources of external knowledge besides the end-
user.  In fact, the entire field of open innovation is based on the insight that it is not 
always practical for a firm to simply accumulate all the knowledge it needs internally 
(Chesbrough, 2003). 
A great deal of study has been devoted in recent decades to how readily such 
information is transferred.  Eric von Hippel coined the term “sticky information” (1994) 
to describe information that has a “cost” associated with its transfer from one individual 
to another.  Tacit information will naturally be more costly to transfer than explicit, 
codified information.  Especially with cutting edge technologies, knowledge may not be 
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well codified or even able to be codified, in which case it can only be passed on by 
example. 
There are things that we know but cannot tell. This is strikingly true for 
our knowledge of skills. I can say that I know how to ride a bicycle or how 
to swim, but this does not mean that I can tell how I manage to keep my 
balance on a bicycle or keep afloat when swimming. I may not have the 
slightest idea of how I do this, or even an entirely wrong or grossly 
imperfect idea of it, and yet go on cycling or swimming merrily. Yet, it 
cannot be said that I know how to bicycle or swim and not know how to 
coordinate the complex pattern of muscular acts by which I do my cycling 
or swimming. It follows that I know how to carry out these performances 
as a whole and that I also know how to carry out the elementary acts 
which constitute them, but that, though I know these acts, I cannot tell 
what they are. (Polanyi, 1962) 
 
Stickiness can also be high, and difficult to transfer, when there is a large amount of 
information available, not all of which is germane to the problem but which is not known 
beforehand (von Hippel, 2005).  For example, the operational environment of a product 
may consist of a huge number of variables, many of which influence the performance to 
no more than a negligible extent.  Vernacular language and “balkanization” along 
specializations in both technology and the user communities can further serve to keep 
tacit information accessible to only those inside their respective communities (Brown and 
Duguil, 2001). 
Often the information needed to solve a problem will initially reside in two 
distinct locations.  For example, information about the need is initially located entirely at 
the user’s site, while information pertaining to products resides with the manufacturer or 
supplier.  A need is encountered, a potential solution is proposed, and the solution tested.  
If this information is “sticky,” however, a pattern emerges in which the problem solving 
process takes the form of an iterative, trial-and-error proposition, as shown schematically 
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in Figure 1 (von Hippel, 1994).  Rather than transferring the sticky information between 
the two directly, it is less “costly” to develop a prototype that can be modified until the 
user finds it to have acceptable characteristics (von Hippel, 1994). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Iterative Problem-solving Pattern Often Encountered in New Product and 
Service Development (von Hippel, 1994) 
 
 
The term “user” in innovation studies denotes, strictly speaking, the individual or 
organization which benefits from using a product, whereas the manufacturer benefits 
from selling the product.  There are many instances where users have developed products 
and processes that became commercially successful (Schreier and Prugl, 2008).  For 
example, von Hippel (1976) found that over 80% of the innovations in scientific 
instruments were made by users and not manufacturers.  In fields as varied as library 
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information systems and extreme sports, a significant proportion of innovations have 
been shown to be user developed (Morrison et al., 2000; Franke and Shaw, 2003). 
The motivation for users to innovate may be strong for a number of reasons.  A 
small market may not be sufficiently attractive to manufacturers to justify investing in a 
new product development project (von Hippel, 2005).  The more unique the need, in fact, 
the more advantageous it will be for the customer to develop a new product (von Hippel, 
2004). Similarly, it has been documented that when available, users are often willing to 
pay extra for custom products, as opposed to “one-size-fits-all” offerings (Franke and von 
Hippel, 2003). 
As a consequence of the stickiness of information discussed above, different 
players in the innovation process will each tend to rely upon the knowledge they already 
have. As a result, users on their own will tend to develop innovations that provide new 
functions.  In contrast, manufacturers, who lack the contextual knowledge of the user, 
will tend to develop innovations that improve the performance, convenience, or reliability 
of existing functions (von Hippel, 2005). 
Lead users are a special class of user that exhibit two general qualities.  First, they 
experience needs or performance issues before the bulk of the marketplace will.  Second, 
they will benefit substantially from any solution to that need.  This makes lead users 
much more amenable to innovation (von Hippel, 1988).  Lettl (2007) further 
differentiates “technology lead users” who will not necessarily benefit more but do, 
however, recognize the relevance and benefit of new technology much earlier than 
manufacturers and other users.  As users involved in innovation rely on their own 
experience, there is a natural disposition to focus on improving the product with which 
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they are already familiar, a behavior von Hippel called “user fixedness” (1986).  
However, lead users also have the potential to develop radical innovations and possess 
the motivation to adopt them (Enkel et al., 2005).  
 
Dynamics of change (innovation trajectories) 
As an innovation is new to the end-user, the act of adopting an innovation 
involves a conscious action.  In other words, the user must decide to abandon the status 
quo.  In order to achieve a sufficiently high level of motivation, the user will need to be 
convinced that the switching costs are lower than the anticipated benefits that will result 
from implementing the change (Lettl, 2005).  Adoption can then, in essence, be viewed as 
the end-result of the decision-making process, beginning at the point in time when an 
individual is first aware of an innovation and ending with implementation of the 
innovation (Rogers, 2003, 1995). 
The differences between innovation, invention, and creativity have been well 
established.  Innovation has been defined variously as “invention plus exploitation” and 
"an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit of 
adoption" (Rogers, 2003).  Something is only innovative if it adds customer value to the 
marketplace.  An invention may be novel and the result of brilliant insight, but it is not in 
itself an innovation unless it meets and is put into use to address a need (Carlson and 
Wilmot, 2006).  A product moving from research into production, at the same time 
adding some value to the firm (even if only cost savings), would be considered an 
innovation.  Innovation thus differs from invention in that it “provides economic value 
and is diffused to other parties beyond the discoverers” (Garcia and Calantone, 2001).  
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Certainly, creative solutions to both articulated and unarticulated needs abound, but all 
such approaches are inconsequential if not adopted. 
From the perspective of the firm, which exists only to satisfy the customer 
(Drucker, 1967), some competitive advantage is necessary for superior performance 
(Porter, 1980).  It follows that innovation should be a fundamental determinant of firm 
performance (Rogers, 2003).  Superior performance, then, is simply the result of 
providing superior customer value (Slater, 1997). 
A need generally arises due to some performance gap.  Over time, the competitive 
advantage held by a firm due to the superior performance of its process and/or products 
will dwindle due to a host of factors and eventually be completely overtaken by a 
competing firm (Rogers, 2003).  To regain some of its competitive advantage, the firm 
must address this performance issue.  Lead users are the first among their peers to 
experience this (von Hippel, 1988; Lettl, 2007) 
Foster (1986) illustrated this as a plot of performance versus time in the familiar 
“S-curve” shown in Figure 2.  Performance for a new technology increases slowly at first, 
with the gains then coming more quickly until an inflection point is reached and the rate 
of change declines until a plateau is reached.  For a technology in this mature state, 
incremental performance improvements become increasingly expensive and eventually 
cost-prohibitive.  Occasionally, this performance trajectory is altered through some 
breakthrough, resulting in a “punctuated equilibrium,” and the technology curve is 
abruptly changed; in these instances, incremental performance gains again become 
achievable in relatively short order under a similar trajectory (Tushman and Anderson, 
1986). 
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Figure 2.  S-Curve (adapted from Foster, 1986) 
 
A radical innovation is one that changes some paradigm, offering a different value 
proposition than was previously available.  As contrasted with sustaining innovation, a 
radical or disruptive innovation initially often underperforms the incumbent technology 
(Christensen, 1997).  Foster’s S-curve for a new, “attacking” technology can be overlaid 
on that of the incumbent technology and, in such cases, the performance eventually 
matches and finally outstrips that of the incumbent as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  The Conventional Technology S-Curve (adapted from Christensen, 1997) 
 
A growing body of research has observed that innovation is not at all predictable 
from the standpoint of the superiority or inferiority of any given approach, nor does 
technological advancement necessarily flow along a logical path.  In other words, the 
“superior” technology is not always adopted.  Utterback (1994), in his seminal work on 
dominant design, provides numerous case studies where product development was an 
arbitrary process and concludes that the “emergence of a dominant design is not 
necessarily predetermined, but is the result of the interplay between technical and market 
choices at any particular time.” 
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For example, the so-called QWERTY keyboard layout that persists on today’s 
smart phones was developed for early mechanical typewriters to keep them from 
jamming.  The IBM PC was an assembly of established components – monitor, that same 
QWERTY keyboard, a relatively simple operating system – with no real breakthrough 
technologies and managed to capture the majority of the market.  These products are of a 
design that is the end-product of “experiments, technical possibilities, individual choices, 
proprietary positions, and – to some extent – sheer inertia” (Utterback, 1994). 
Further, technological superiority does not always advance in a continuous, linear 
manner.  For example, methods of strengthening concrete developed in first century A.D. 
Rome were lost until the 19th century (Berkun, 2010).  In fact, it can be dangerous to 
view history in a completely objective light as it pertains to technological advancements, 
as the “winner” in any competitive environment is the result of a wide array of boundary 
conditions, serendipity, and coincidence (Utterback, 1994; Christensen 1997; Berkun, 
2010; Carlson and Wilmon, 2006). 
It is not the firm itself that innovates but the individual members; in other words, 
“organizations do not intuit” (Reid, 2004).  There is, therefore, a lack of any clear 
pathway to a successful innovation simply because humans will always have to be 
convinced in the end.  Reid (2004) perhaps puts it best: “’invention’ is a cognitive 
process, while ‘innovation’ is a social process.”  Thus, having access to brilliant, creative 
people and a novel idea will not in itself produce a firm which is adept at innovation.  
While the producer possesses generic solution information, context-of-use information 
resides with the customer, and the exchange of this information is the key to innovative 
adoption (von Hippel, 2004). 
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Characterizing the level of customer engagement 
Studies conducted in the past several decades are surprisingly inconclusive as to 
the degree specific factors positively and negatively influence success, in this case 
whether or not a new product (as a proxy for innovation) is accepted by the end-
customer.  This inconsistency of conclusions can be attributed to a variety of reasons, not 
the least of which is the wide range of measures of “success” (van der Panne et al., 2003).  
Still, patterns do emerge from the literature. 
One early study, the Scientific Activity Predictor from Patterns with Heuristic 
Origins (SAPPHO) research, compared and contrasted successful and unsuccessful 
innovations in the United Kingdom and identified 27 explicit factors that influenced 
success.  In general, success and failure were related to the firms’ understanding of their 
customers, their marketing capacity, their product development process, and their ability 
to deal with information (Freeman, 1971).  Project NewProd was a study of innovation in 
Canada which concluded that the marketability of a new product is determined by, among 
other things, how well the firm understood future market developments (Cooper, 1979).  
In their Stanford Innovation Project, Maidique and Zirger (1984) also found a number of 
factors influencing the viability of a new product, including understanding of the 
customers and the marketplace. 
Henard and Szymanski (2001) found “significant impact on new product 
performance” by product advantage, market potential, meeting customer needs, pre-
development task proficiencies, and dedicated resources.  In a review of 43 studies on the 
determinants of success and failure of innovation, van der Panne et al. (2003) identified 
four general classifications for these determinants:  the firm itself, the product itself, the 
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market, and the project.  More specifically, they found positive impacts from a firm’s 
culture, its experience with innovation, and its use of multidisciplinary teams that 
possessed “in particular equilibrium between technological and marketing skills.”  
Hanssen and Faegri (2006) found close customer engagement to be beneficial, albeit with 
certain drawbacks and costs, in a longitudinal case study of a single software firm but did 
not characterize the level of engagement.  Foss et al. (2010) propose that the link between 
customer interaction and innovative performance is mediated through a number of 
organizational practices. 
  Firm performance, as measured by new product success, can vary by the stage in 
the new product development cycle that the customer is involved, as well as the 
characteristics of the customers involved (Gruner and Homburg, 2000).  This link may 
also be impacted by the number of customers engaged, especially in early stages.  Too 
many customers involved in early stages, for example, may lead to less innovation 
through the demand for more and more requirements; if there are not enough customers 
involved, the group may be less likely to grasp the radicalness of the proposal (Lettl, 
2007). 
 
The mechanics of bringing customers and solution providers together 
A 2009 Defense Science Board study found over 20 separate initiatives within the 
defense department with the explicit intent of responding to urgent warfighter needs.  
This same study also found that more than 90 percent of the needs submitted by the Army 
were actually urgent requests for additional equipment already available and not a 
perceived technology gap at all; the rest fell along a “wide continuum ranging from ill-
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defined equipment to requests for additional supplies of standard equipment” (DSB, 
2009). 
Incremental or sustaining innovation provides an increase in performance to the 
existing system and brings an improved product to the existing marketplace.  Incremental 
improvements to the incumbent technology, be it microchips or stone tools, may improve 
performance enough to maintain an edge in the early stages, and as the user is familiar 
with the incumbent technology, such incremental innovation will result in low levels of 
uncertainty.  So long as the sustaining innovation can provide sufficient gains, the user 
will continue to readily adopt those innovations.  Over time, however, incremental 
changes come at increasingly higher costs and result in smaller gains.  Eventually, there 
is no performance margin left to exploit or it is accompanied by increasingly unattractive 
trade-offs (Christensen, 1997).  
The performance difference between competitors becomes a chronic problem, and 
chronic problems defy simple solutions.  Yet, regardless of how well the user understands 
the technology, if they are confident the problem will ultimately be solved by changing, 
they will abandon the status quo if there is sufficient motivation.  If the proposed solution 
is a radical innovation, the level of uncertainty is higher than for sustaining innovation, 
and the required leap of faith will be greater than it would be for incremental innovation.  
Different firms will have different ways of dealing with the uncertainty inherent in 
searching for solutions to problems.  A start-up company, for example, will likely adopt a 
cavalier attitude toward risk – bet big, win big.  Established firms will likely be more 
cautious.  Small firms will be able to react more quickly to changes in the environment 
and the technology, and large firms will be able to cover more bets. 
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A well-documented and institutionalized approach to such problem solving exists 
in the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), which by most measures is a “large and 
established firm.”  Under the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System 
(JCIDS), a military problem in the form of a gap in capability is identified and validated.  
Potential solutions, in the form of some combination of changes to the doctrine, 
organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) that 
define the incumbent system are then analyzed.  Cost-effective solutions are refined and, 
eventually, compete for development and procurement resources.  
The JCIDS process provides a clear framework for assessing performance gaps 
from a strategic perspective and consistent guidance in evaluating options for closing 
those gaps.  However, it also creates a clear division of labor in materiel development.  
Entire organizations are established to develop novel ideas, others to test the 
effectiveness of those novel ideas, and still others to assure that those novel ideas can be 
safely and effectively employed. 
In contrast to the JCIDS approach stands the Garbage Can Model, introduced by 
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972), which attempts to explain the decision-making process 
in what the authors refer to as “organizational anarchies,” such as university offices.  In 
these environments, participants vary over time, and are not necessarily aware of a 
specific problem, let alone able to articulate it.  While decisions emanating from the 
JCIDS process are based on rigorous analysis, the decisions that emerge from the 
Garbage Can approach may seem utterly irrational.  Any decision is the result of several 
largely independent streams of events within the organization. 
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From this point of view, an organization is a collection of choices looking 
for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which 
they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be 
the answer, and decision makers looking for work. (Cohen, March and 
Olsen, 1972) 
 
Under this model, the very existence of a problem is something that emerges gradually; 
when it does, it requires attention but may or may not trigger a decision process.  In the 
organization, a “stream of problems” is characterized by the “energy requirement” of 
each problem (i.e., the effort required to make a choice) and all the choices to which each 
problem is linked.  A solution is “an answer actively looking for a question” where the 
question is often not made completely clear until the answer is known.  This “stream of 
choices” is characterized by the participants who are able to make a given choice (Cohen, 
March and Olsen, 1972). 
An interesting aspect of the Garbage Can Model is that it presumes that the state 
of a decision-making process is almost constantly in flux, with different people 
interacting at different energy (motivation) levels at different times.  The decision that is 
ultimately made (or deferred, which is a decision in itself) will change as technology 
matures, as the participants come and go and their energy levels wax and wane, and as 
the urgency of the need (or at least the perception thereof) increases and decreases. 
The garbage can process is one in which problems, solution, and 
participants move from one choice opportunity to another in such a way 
that the nature of the choice, the time it takes, and the problems in solves 
all depend on a relatively complicated intermeshing of 
elements…Problems are worked upon in the context of some choice, but 
choices are made only when the shifting combinations of problems, 
solutions, and decision makers happen to make action possible. (Cohen, 
March and Olsen, 1972) 
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CP-3 projects can arguably be considered finite time slices in a “garbage can model.”  
There are participants who either have a solution or have a problem needing a decision.  
While the problems are defined from the very start of the project, all parties bring their 
own experiences and knowledge to the process at a specific point in time to interact and 
arrive at conclusions mutually.  
There is a case to be made for directly engaging with customers beyond simple 
market research, rather than relying either on the producer to deliver the correct product 
through the iterative process described above or the user’s ability to innovate.  There is in 
fact a theoretical basis for consciously bringing the user into a closer involvement in the 
product development process. 
When information transfer costs are a significant component of the costs 
of the planned problem-solving work, it is reasonable that there will be a 
tendency to carry out innovation-related problem-solving activity at the 
locus of sticky information, other things being equal – just as, in the case 
of production, it is reasonable that a firm will seek to locate its factory at a 
location that will minimize transportation costs, other things being equal 
(von Hippel, 1994). 
 
 
Solomon (2008) recommends the implementation of a number of “best practices” to 
respond to urgent needs within the Defense Department.  Included were a number of key 
factors discussed above, including “early customer interaction and feedback” and to 
“establish, nurture, and expand social networks and contacts as much as possible.”  
Additionally, small teams were explicitly highlighted as key to effective problem-solving 
efforts, with a mix of contracting, budget, technical, and program management 
experience. 
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A team is, however, more than simply a collection of people.  Katzenbach and 
Smith (1993) argue that not all groups who work together are teams.  People may come 
together under focused leadership, individually accountable to some agreed-upon 
purpose, but commitment to the task at hand is what defines a team. 
A team is a small number of people with complementary skills who are 
committed to a common purpose, set of performance goals, and approach 
for which they hold themselves mutually accountable. (Katzenbach and 
Smith, 1993) 
 
Beyond this shared vision, truly high-performance teams have a strong group culture 
built upon mutual trust (Catska et al., 2001).  Team performance has been shown to 
improve when team members are able to effectively judge nonverbal cues of their 
teammates’ emotions (Bender et al., 2010).  While diversity among team members 
initially invites stereotyping, working on a task that all team members care about results 
in decreasing interpersonal conflict and increasing that awareness of coworkers’ feelings 
(Hackman, 2011).  These factors are all in play within CP-3 projects.  The teams are 
together for up to one year, providing ample time to develop a healthy group culture, and 
are clearly accountable to developing a solution to a defined and difficult problem 
(AFRLI 90-104, 2010). 
Research suggests that increasing team conflict will have a curvilinear effect on 
innovation within the team itself.  In one study, teams were found to be more innovative 
at lower and higher levels of task conflict.  This innovativeness tends, however, to be at 
the expense of short-term goal attainment (de Dru, 2006).  While de Dru’s (2006) study 
focused on internal conflict, the influence of external conflict, such as that imposed by a 
customer with a divergent voice, was not addressed.  
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III. Methodology 
 
A natural experiment is a situation in which there has been no intentional 
manipulation of treatments to test subjects by the person or persons conducting the 
experiment; as a result, the treatments may often be considered randomly assigned, 
thereby simulating a well-designed experiment (DiNardo, 2008).  The classic example of 
a natural experiment, the 1854 London cholera outbreak presented John Snow with the 
means to statistically analyze the proximity of cholera cases to specific geographic 
locations.  Cases of cholera were shown to be related not to “bad air” per the dominant 
theory of the day but to exposure to polluted water supplies that was not controlled by 
Snow or anyone else. 
In similar fashion, Core Process Three (CP-3) projects offer an opportunity to 
measure relationships among various treatments and outcomes without handicapping or 
helping any given effort.  While not as ethically dubious as controlling an individual’s 
access to clean water, it would nonetheless be possible but unwise to attempt to 
manipulate factors that are theorized as influencing the outcome in any “real-world” 
problem-solving endeavor.  As in the Cholera outbreak, with the projects already 
completed, measurements can be made and appropriate factors correlated ex post facto in 
order to identify any possible relationships among those factors. 
 
Survey Design 
This research is interested in the relationship between how well the problem (as 
previously defined herein) is understood by the CP-3 project members and the level of 
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interaction with the customer (also as previously defined).  As an abstract concept, it is 
not possible to directly quantify how well a problem or need is understood or how 
engaged the user was during the project. These can, however, be inferred from responses 
to related questions through statistical analysis.  In simple terms, a series of carefully 
worded questions may be asked of the respondents, with the hope that patterns will 
emerge in the responses.  It is then possible to calculate underlying dimensions based on 
correlations among these interrelated variables.  This results in a smaller set of factors 
which explain “the maximum amount of common variance in a correlation matrix using 
the smallest number of explanatory constructs” (Field, 2009).  To this end, a series of 
questions were drafted, with each intended to measure one and only one of the abstract 
concepts previously defined and discussed. 
1. Customer engagement: the technologist’s assessment of the degree to which the 
customer was involved during the CP-3 project. 
 
2. Customer unity of voice: the technologist’s assessment of the consistency of the 
feedback provided by the customer. 
 
3. Problem understanding: the technologist’s assessment of how well they 
appreciated the needs of the user. 
 
4. Confidence in solution: the technologist’s assessment of their own confidence 
that the option or options provided would adequately meet the user’s need. 
 
5. Level of innovation: the technologist’s assessment of the nature of the option 
proposed to the user by the technologists as a departure from the incumbent 
system or approach, i.e., how large of a “leap of faith” was required to accept the 
proposed solution option. 
 
Validated measures are extremely useful tools.  Unfortunately, no readily available 
measures were found in the literature that would adequately address these constructs.  
There are numerous measures for customer satisfaction but a dearth in the specific areas 
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of interest.  For that reason, new measures unique to this research were developed and 
their statistical validity assessed.  Arguably, there may be potential proxies for “level of 
innovation,” such as technology readiness level (TRL).  However, given the specific 
interest in the “leap of faith” required of the customer, it was deemed more judicious to 
attempt to develop a unique measure for that construct as well. 
 Six to eight survey items were initially developed for each of the above 
constructs, with each survey item being in the form of a statement.  The goal was for each 
subject to respond to each statement using a five-point interval (i.e., Likert) scale, with 
one being “strongly disagree,” two being “disagree,” three being “neither agree nor 
disagree,” four being “agree,” and five being “strongly agree.”  Several people not 
involved in the research were asked to read each question and categorize them into 
groups of related questions.  The intent of this exercise was to identify questions which 
may have unintentionally mapped into more than one of the higher-level constructs or 
into an unexpected construct.  After reviewing the resultant categorization, questions that 
were shown to be ambiguous or otherwise troubling were removed.  Using this process, 
each of the five constructs were represented by four individual items, thus forming the 
20-question survey shown in Table 1.  (The survey also asked respondents to identify the 
specific CP-3 project in which they had participated.) 
  The survey items were labeled with a shorthand notation to identify the higher 
latent construct they were designed to assess, e.g., the first item assessing customer 
engagement was labeled “CE1” and so forth.  In the survey, the questions were 
alternated, with a question pertaining to a given construct being followed by a question of 
the next construct, and so on.  For example, CE1 was immediately followed by UOV1, 
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where “UOV1” was the first question under the unity of voice construct.  This notation 
was not found on the questionnaire itself and was only used for convenience in dealing 
with and presenting the data. 
 
 
Table 1. Research Questionnaire 
Label Question 
CE1 The customer was actively involved in the development of the solution. 
CE2 The customer offered ideas for improving the technical solution. 
CE3 The customer asked meaningful questions. 
CE4 The customer was interested in the technical details of the solution. 
UOV1 The customer spoke with a single voice. 
UOV2 The feedback provided by the customer was consistent. 
UVO3 We received the same answers to any questions we had for the customer 
regardless of who we asked. 
UOV4 The same individuals represented the customer throughout the project. 
PU1 I can explain the shortfalls of the existing system. 
PU2 The problem we were trying to solve was clear to me by the end of the project. 
PU3 I understand the operational limitations of the system used by the customer. 
PU4 I have an appreciation for the environment the customer works in. 
CIS1 The team felt that the proposed solution was the best solution. 
CIS2 There were no dissenting opinions regarding the solution among the team 
members. 
CIS3 The team believed the proposed solution was adequate. 
CIS4 The team was enthusiastic about the solution we proposed. 
LOI1 The customer was uncomfortable with the proposed solution the first time it 
was presented. 
LOI2 It was difficult getting the customer to understand the proposed solution. 
LOI3 The customer would have had difficulty explaining the proposed solution to 
other users. 
LOI4 The proposed solution surprised the customer. 
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Survey Population 
The intended survey participants were individual members of the CP-3 projects.  
As the projects were carried out as much as six years prior, obtaining contact information 
on those individuals was a concern.  Fortunately, contact information for the project 
managers was available for each of the CP-3 projects.  By interviewing these project 
managers, as many of the project members as possible were identified. 
Initial phone interviews were conducted with the project managers.  Although the 
primary purpose of interviewing the project managers was to obtain contact information 
on the members of the technical teams, there were a number of additional questions 
intended to provide additional insight into the projects themselves, a better understanding 
of the CP-3 process in general, and identify any unusual circumstances associated with a 
given project that would call into question its suitability for this research or explain 
otherwise unexpected results.  All questions asked of the project managers were provided 
ahead of time and are shown in Table 2. 
  The actual customers were not contacted in this research. While this may 
arguably appear contradictory, given that the focus was on the relationship between the 
solution provider and the user, their availability for the research was much less consistent 
than that of the project team members.  Most of the customers were active-duty military 
and subject to deployments, job changes, and separation more often than the contractor 
personnel who comprised the project teams.  
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Table 2. Project Manager Interview Questions  
Label Question 
A.1 Names and contact information of contractor personnel involved in the project. 
A.2 Scheduled and actual project start and end dates. 
A.3 Available documentation (e.g., reports or briefings); if none available, 
descriptions of the problem, original system, and proposed solution. 
A.4 Was there a TRL (technology readiness level) associated with the proposed 
solution?  If not, what would it have been, in your estimation? 
A.5 Were there any unforeseen circumstances unrelated to the project itself that 
caused any appreciable disruptions (e.g., weather-induced delays, change to the 
original problem, loss of a team member)? 
B.1 How often was the customer briefed? 
B.2 Did these briefings tend to be formal or informal? 
B.3 How would you characterize the customer’s engagement at these briefings? 
B.4 Was the customer involved in the project beyond these briefings?  If so, at 
what levels? 
B.5 How many different “voices of the customer” were there?  Can you elaborate? 
B.6 In your opinion, did the customer have a vision of a preferred solution prior to 
the start of the project? 
B.7 Did the customer’s understanding of the problem change over the course of the 
project?  If so, to what extent? 
B.8 Did the customer’s expectations change over the course of the project?  If so, 
to what extent? 
B.9 Was there any turnover in the customer personnel from the start of the project 
to the end? 
  
 
Project Selection 
With only 18 CP-3 projects conducted to date, the need to maximize the survey 
participants was clear.  However, it was deemed equally important to maintain as 
homogenous a population as possible.  Based on discussions with individuals involved in 
the overall CP-3 process, and on information gleaned from the project manager 
interviews, judgments were made as to whether any specific project should be excluded 
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from the research.  In general, the following considerations formed a somewhat 
subjective basis for inclusion of projects. 
1. Participants must be able to reasonably assess all the questionnaire items; 
while this research was not concerned with adoption rates or other such 
measures of success, projects that did not include a proposed solution were 
excluded. 
 
2. Any barriers to the interaction between the user/customer and the project team 
would likely influence the results; projects in which that interaction was 
clearly limited were excluded. 
 
3. Any projects in which the project manager could not be contacted were 
excluded. 
 
4. The project team should have been able to work free from oversight or 
direction from any group other than the customer/user; if any significant 
outside influence was present, the project would be excluded. 
  
Questionnaire Deployment and Assessment 
The CP-3 project members were predominantly contractor personnel, and they 
proved to be readily accessible by email.  The survey instrument was hosted on a 
commercial web site and a link to the survey was emailed to all subjects.  The web site 
directly collected the input to all questionnaires and populated a spreadsheet which 
provided easy input into the statistical analysis software.  The survey itself was also 
included in the email in case the web site was not accessible for some reason; e-mail 
responses were manually entered into the spreadsheet.  Once the survey was closed to 
new input, a variety of statistical measures were assessed to validate the hypothesized 
constructs, to possibly derive more meaningful constructs, and to assess any relationships 
between and among the constructs.  The statistical analysis was accomplished using 
SPSS, a well-regarded computer program widely used in behavioral studies. 
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The five constructs (customer engagement, singular voice of the customer, 
problem understanding, confidence in solution, and level of innovation) were individually 
analyzed for reliability.  Reliability is defined by Field (2009) as “the ability of a measure 
to produce consistent results when the same entities are measured under different 
conditions.”  In other words, reliability provides some level of assurance that, as an 
aggregate, the questions comprising each construct are measuring the same latent 
variable.  The most common measure of scale reliability is Cronbach’s α, with values 
near or above 0.8 generally indicating acceptable reliability. 
Should any or all of the constructs clearly show unacceptable reliability, the 
research is not necessarily void.  By applying principal component analysis (PCA) to 
larger selections of the questionnaire items, more deeply hidden latent variables may be 
uncovered.  By identifying clusters of high correlations between subsets of variables, 
PCA can be used to show where those variables may be measuring the same underlying 
dimension (Field, 2009).  By reexamining the questions that cluster together, these 
underlying dimensions (i.e., latent variables) can be pulled from the data.  Depending on 
how different these new constructs are from those that were initially proposed, the 
research questions are in such cases generally reassessed. 
The resulting constructs – be they the original five latent variables or some 
combination of emergent variables – are then correlated to determine the extent of any 
statistically significant relationships among one another.  Correlation is the normalized 
(non-dimensional) relationship between two variables.  Simply put, it is an indication of 
whether or not changes in one variable are accompanied by changes in the other, and it is 
not an indication of causality.  For instance, a positively correlated relationship between 
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customer involvement and problem understanding does not mean that a higher level of 
customer involvement causes a higher level of customer understanding; it only indicates 
that they tend to occur together.  The significance of each relationship is also measured, 
which is an indication of the level of confidence that the observed relationship was not 
the result of a random chance.  Pearson’s r is a common measure of correlation, and 
values near 0.5 indicate a “large” effect (Field, 2009). 
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IV. Results 
 
As one might expect, not all 18 projects were included in the research; the 
circumstances behind those that were excluded are discussed below.  The project 
manager interviews are summarized and the questionnaire deployment is addressed.  The 
detailed statistical analysis of the survey data and the relationship to the research 
questions are discussed. 
 
Project Selection 
As discussed in the previous section, consistency in the structure of CP-3 projects 
presents the opportunity to assess the influence of customer engagement on the 
understanding of the customer need.  Any situations that may potentially introduce 
confounding factors therefore need to be addressed.  Table 3 provides a complete list of 
the CP-3 projects, with annotations on the reasons for their inclusion or exclusion. 
One project was classified at the Secret level.  While it certainly is of interest, 
restrictions inherent in dealing with information at any level of classification above 
Unclassified will have a direct influence on the ability of all parties to interact and 
communicate freely during the project.  As stated previously, the exchange of “sticky 
information” plays a large role in the theories associated with user innovation and team 
performance, and barriers are put in place at higher classification levels to expressly limit 
such exchange.  Further, insights gleaned from the project manager interview may have 
been similarly problematic, which could potentially mask other issues that could have 
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affected the data.  This precluded it from being compared to Unclassified projects from a 
customer involvement perspective, and therefore was not investigated. 
 
 
Table 3. Core Process 3 Projects 
 
  
Project Result/Circumstances Included 
Identify Friendly Ground 
Forces 
Solution developed by team Yes 
Helicopter Brownout Solution developed by team Yes 
Fleeting Targets Solution developed by team Yes 
Space Situational Awareness Solution developed by team Yes 
Landing in Zero-Zero 
Conditions 
Commercial products identified No 
UAV Operations Center Solution developed by team Yes 
Battle Field Airman Tactical 
Targeting 
Project manager not contacted No 
Classified Excluded due to classification No 
Space Operations Solution developed by team Yes 
IED Defeat Solution developed by team Yes 
Gunship Situational 
Awareness 
Project still underway No 
Covert Marker Solution developed by team Yes 
Precision Navigation CP-2 project initiated No 
Remote Weather Sensor Congressional plus-up addressing need No 
Signaling Customer initiating program utilizing existing 
technology  
No 
Single Pass Airdrop Solution developed by team Yes 
Coordinated Constellation Solution developed by team Yes 
Automated Airfield Survey 
and Ground Hardness 
Solution developed by team Yes 
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The other projects that were excluded were not ultimately completed under the 
auspices of CP-3.  These projects were moved to a program of record, a less-focused 
laboratory effort to mature needed technology, or a project funded directly by Congress 
outside the President’s Budget Request process.  In all such cases, certain questions on 
the survey would be unanswerable, and therefore these were also removed from the 
sample.  The remaining 11 projects were deemed sufficiently homogenous for the 
purposes of this research and comprised the study sample. 
 
Project Manager Interviews 
A total of 15 project managers were solicited for interviews, representing the 11 
CP-3 projects (some of the projects had more than one manager).  Of these 15 project 
managers, 13 agreed to be interviewed and to provide contact information for the 
technical team members.  All phone interviews were conducted during the period from 9 
February to 6 March 2012.  These interviews were not intended to form the basis for case 
studies of those projects, nor for CP-3 in general, but rather to document any particular 
issues or unusual situations which may have arisen during the project that would 
potentially preclude it from being included in the sample or otherwise influencing the 
data. 
As stated above, the earliest CP-3 projects were five and six years ago.  Still, 
regardless of how long ago their experience was, all the project managers had little 
difficulty addressing the questions.  All were enthusiastic and clearly felt their 
experiences were very positive.  The answers provided to the interview questions were 
supplemented with unsolicited background information, anecdotes, and offers to provide 
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additional information.  As final reports on individual CP-3 projects are difficult to 
obtain, the interviews proved to be extremely informative. 
 
Questionnaire Deployment and Response 
The project managers who were contacted supplied the names and contact 
information for 40 people who worked on one of the retained CP-3 projects.  The link to 
the questionnaire was sent by email to those individuals on 20 March 2012, and the web 
site was closed to new input on 4 April 2012.  In all, there were 30 surveys received for a 
75% response rate.  All but two were submitted directly on the web site; the two provided 
directly via email were appended to the data manually.  A total of eight projects were 
represented by the responses, as three projects received no responses.  Of those eight 
projects, the average number of responses received per project was 3.75, and the number 
for a given project ranged from one to seven.  Means and standard deviations for each of 
the five sub-scale measures are shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4.  Questionnaire Response Means and Standard Deviations 
Project 
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Fleeting Targets                                        1
     
4.75  
     
5.00  
     
4.75  
     
4.50  
     
1.75  
 
Coordinated Constellation                                   6
     
4.38  
     
3.67  
     
4.00  
     
3.75  
     
2.50  
ID Friendly Ground Forces             4 
     
4.29  
     
3.81  
     
4.38  
     
3.88  
     
2.06  
 
Space Situational Awareness                              7 
     
3.75  
     
3.32  
     
4.46  
     
3.96  
     
2.50  
Space Operations                                    3
     
4.08  
     
3.42  
     
3.33  
     
4.00  
     
2.33  
Helicopter Brownout                                   3
     
3.58  
     
3.33  
     
4.25  
     
3.67  
     
2.25  
 
Robotic Assault Zone Survey                            4
     
4.25  
     
3.19  
     
4.25  
     
4.31  
     
1.94  
 
Single Pass Airdrop    2 
     
4.75  
     
4.38  
     
4.63  
     
4.38  
     
1.63  
 
Mean 30 4.13  3.58  4.22  3.98  2.24  
 
Standard Deviation  0.90 0.95 0.90 0.90 1.00 
 
 
Questionnaire Results 
Reliability 
Reliability of any measure is the consistency of the results obtained by that 
measure.  According to Field (2009), Cronbach’s α provides an indication of the overall 
reliability of a questionnaire, with values around 0.8 being considered good for 
questionnaires.  Both factor subscales related to customer interaction showed acceptable 
reliability by this standard.  The customer engagement subscale had a high reliability 
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(Cronbach’s α = 0.805).  The voice of the customer subscale showed lower but still 
acceptable reliability, with a Cronbach’s α of 0.756.  The factor subscales characterizing 
the problem and solution exhibited lower reliability, however.  Cronbach’s α for problem 
understanding was 0.672, and just 0.487 and 0.432 for confidence in solution and level of 
innovation, respectively. 
The intent of the questionnaire was to measure five latent variables through four 
questions each that were to align to one particular latent variable.  If that were the case, as 
noted above, each portion of the questionnaire would be expected to exhibit reasonable 
reliability; that appears to be the case for the two customer interaction constructs but less 
so for the remaining three constructs.  Taken as a whole, principal component analysis 
(PCA) can be applied to provide insight into the underlying variables that are actually 
being measuring and how they may differ from what was intended to be measured.  
While PCA is most commonly associated with the social sciences, it can be used in many 
situations where a characteristic cannot be directly measured (Field, 2009).  No attempt 
will be made here to explain the theory and mechanics behind PCA; the reader may refer 
to any number of sources for a more thorough understanding (Field, 2009; Joliffe, 2002). 
To this end, a PCA was initially conducted on the 12 survey items associated with 
the problem and solution characterization, that is, the items that were intended to assess 
the three theorized constructs of problem understanding, confidence in solution, and level 
of innovation.  In this exercise, the level of innovation construct was problematic.  
Neither removal of individual questionnaire items nor combinations of items improved 
the results of the analysis to the point where any meaningful conclusions could be drawn. 
46 
 
In hindsight, the reasons for this are more obvious after having deployed the 
questionnaire.  The items related to level of innovation differ markedly from problem 
understanding and confidence in solution; instead, they focused on the perceived ability 
of the customer to understand and fully appreciate the solution.  As previously shown in 
Table 1, the four items for this construct are shown below. 
LOI1.  “The customer was uncomfortable with the proposed solution the first time 
it was presented.” 
 
LOI2.  “It was difficult getting the customer to understand the proposed solution.” 
 
LOI3.  “The customer would have had difficulty explaining the proposed solution 
to other users.” 
 
LOI4.  “The proposed solution surprised the customer.” 
 
Low reliability indicates that these items may be relatively ambiguously worded.  In any 
case, they are most certainly negatively worded; the intent, as stated previously, was to 
quantify the required “leap of faith” that would serve as a proxy for innovativeness.  
There unfortunately appears to be little additional statistical manipulation available which 
would permit any meaningful conclusions to be drawn from that portion of the 
questionnaire.  This effectively eliminates the potential of confirming or rejecting the 
hypothesized relationship between more radical solutions and the level of customer 
involvement. 
Upon removal of these four items, the eight remaining items, when taken as a 
whole, were intended to ascertain how well the problem was understood and, specifically, 
how that understanding translated to a solution acceptable to the customer.  A PCA was 
conducted on these eight items with orthogonal rotation (varimax).  The Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin measure, KMO = 0.699, verified the sampling adequacy, and Bartlett’s test of 
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sphericity was significant, X
2
 = 61.115, p < 0.001, indicating that correlations between 
items were sufficiently large for PCA (Field, 2009). 
Three components had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and in 
combination explained 66.6% of the variance.  The second and third components did not 
significantly exceed Kaiser’s criterion, with eigenvalues of 1.199 and 1.022, respectively.  
The scree plot showed inflections that would justify up to three components.  However, 
only the first component showed acceptable reliability (Cronbach’s α = 0.798); for the 
second and third components, the reliability values were 0.516 and 0.708, respectively.  
Due to the low reliability of the second and third components extracted, only the first 
component was considered for further analysis.  The following items clustered together to 
form this initial component. 
PU1.  “The problem we were trying to solve was clear to me by the end of the 
project.” 
 
PU2.  “I understand the operational limitations of the system used by the 
customer.” 
 
PU3.  “I have an appreciation for the environment the customer works in.” 
 
CIS1.  “The team felt that the proposed solution was the best solution.” 
 
CIS3.  “The team believed the proposed solution was adequate.” 
 
Three questionnaire items did not cluster with the above, which provides some insight 
into the difference with the as-intended constructs of problem understanding and 
confidence in solution.  The item “I can explain the shortfall of the existing system” was 
intended to assess the level of problem understanding.  Still, it is conceivable that there 
were cases where there was no incumbent system, or where the incumbent system was 
not the focus of the solution.  In fact, once it becomes apparent that a discontinuous 
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solution is the most viable approach, fully understanding the incumbent system may be 
interesting academically but less important, or at least less urgent, than comprehending 
the pros and cons associated with a radically different approach.  The problem, in other 
words, may simply be that the incumbent system does not sufficiently meet the needs of 
the user and should be discarded. 
Two other items did not cluster with this component: “there were no dissenting 
opinions regarding the solution among the team members” and “the team was 
enthusiastic about the solution we proposed.”  These differ from the other items in that 
they are asking for assessments of the viewpoints of others rather than one’s own 
viewpoint.  Additionally, even if these were expected to measure the team’s confidence 
in the solution, this may be more of a measure of a unity of opinion that may or may not 
exist in a given team.  Again, a variety of potential confounding variables are 
conceivable, reflecting perhaps some interpersonal elements of the team, which were not 
otherwise measured, directly or indirectly. 
The remaining five highly clustered items stated above thus portray a subtly 
different characterization from, strictly speaking, either the understanding of the problem 
and the confidence that the problem could be solved.  Instead, the items seem to address 
an empathy with the customer, which requires an appreciation of the challenges faced in 
both the technology and the environment.  Taken together, these items suggest this “new” 
component represents the perceived viability of the proposed solution, which in itself 
reflects a more robust self-assessment of problem understanding.  Coupled with more 
clearly acceptable reliability, this construct offers an alternative to the as-designed 
construct of problem understanding. 
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Correlations 
The original constructs of customer engagement, voice of the customer, and the 
viability of solution construct which emerged from the PCA, were all correlated.  The 
customer engagement and voice of the customer constructs were also correlated with the 
original theorized problem understanding construct, although that particular measure 
demonstrated less than acceptable reliability. In all cases, significance was assessed for 
one-tailed distribution as the hypotheses were directional.  The results are summarized in 
Table 5.  
 
Table 5. Correlations 
Construct Voice of Problem Viability of 
 Customer Understanding Solution 
Customer Engagement 
Pearson’s r (p) .592 (.000**) .372 (.024) .421 (.011) 
Kendall’s τ (p) .461 (.000**) .390 (.002*) .320 
(.008*) 
Spearman’s ρ (p) .664 (.000**) .557 (.001*) .428 (.010) 
 
Voice of Customer 
Pearson’s r (p)  .653 (.000**) .489 (.011) 
Kendall’s τ (p)  .482 (.000**) .281 
(.008*) 
Spearman’s ρ (p)  .682 (.000**) .428 
(.009*) 
 
Note: all values for p are one-tailed. 
* Significance at the p < 0.01 level 
** Significance at the p < 0.001 level 
 
Both customer engagement and voice of the customer were significantly related to 
both latent dimensions of problem understanding and solution viability.  Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient r for customer engagement and problem understanding (i.e., the 
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original four questions under problem understanding, which showed less than acceptable 
reliability according to Field) was 0.372, p (one-tail) < 0.05; for voice of the customer 
and the problem understanding the effect was even larger, r = 0.653, p (one-tail) < 0.001.  
Customer engagement and voice of the customer were also significantly related to the 
more reliable measure of solution viability.  For customer engagement, r = 0.421, p (one-
tail) < 0.05.  For voice of the customer, the effect was again slightly larger, r = 0.489, p 
(one-tail) < 0.01.  The two measures of customer involvement – customer engagement 
and voice of the customer – were also shown to be related; however, the relationship was 
shown to be positive (r = 0.592, p (one-tailed) < 0.001).  This was in contrast to the 
hypothesized negative relationship. 
Although the data appear to be normally distributed and otherwise not in violation 
of parametric assumptions, there was a relatively small sample size.  Therefore, 
correlations were also calculated using well-regarded non-parametric statistics, 
Spearman’s ρ and Kendall’s τ.  Kendall’s τ is more appropriate in this case, given the 
small data set and the use of a Likert scale; Field (2009) further argues that it is a more 
accurate measure than Spearman’s ρ.  Regardless, both statistics showed significant 
relationships in all cases.  These results are also summarized in Table 5. 
Partial correlations – measuring the relationship between two constructs while 
controlling for the effects of the third – were also examined.  With voice of the customer 
as the control variable, there was no significant relationship between customer 
engagement and the two problem understanding constructs.  However, with customer 
engagement as the control variable, the relationships between voice of the customer and 
either of the problem understanding constructs were lower by only a small amount.  For 
51 
 
the original problem understanding construct, r = 0.579 compared to 0.653 (p in both 
cases < 0.001).  For the derived construct, viability of solution, r = 0.328 compared to r = 
0.489 for the bivariate correlation, although in this case the significance was lower, p < 
0.05 versus p < 0.01. 
 
Discussion 
The statistical reliability of the theorized latent constructs as-proposed was shown 
to be satisfactory only for customer engagement and voice of the customer.  Given the 
relatively small sample population, reasonable levels of reliability are by no means 
assured.  It is nonetheless disappointing that three of the five measures demonstrated 
inadequate statistical reliability.  The concept of the “level of innovation” is problematic 
at best, and with the benefit of hindsight, the measure needs much more development to 
be meaningful.  Thus, no conclusions are proposed relative to any of those hypothesized 
relationships. 
Combining (or, more correctly, collapsing) the separate constructs of problem 
understanding and confidence in solution into a single construct, again in hindsight, is 
perhaps less of an issue or concern.  The construct that emerged from the PCA, the 
perceived viability of solution, can be thought of as “we addressed the customer’s true 
need.”  This is arguably a more important measure than simply providing a solution.  
This derived construct appears to get at the heart of the concept, that is, just how well the 
problem, with all of its nuances, is appreciated by an outsider.  In any case, it does 
present a more straightforward dependent variable and makes for a more parsimonious 
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theory as regards the relationships with the independent variables of customer 
engagement and customer voice. 
Relationship between customer engagement and problem/solution understanding 
Supporting the hypothesized relationship, problem understanding was shown to 
be positively related to customer engagement; the observed correlations with both the 
original and the derived construct are significant.  Engaging the customer clearly 
improves the exchange of tacit, “sticky” information in both directions.  The technologist, 
charged with providing solution options to the customer, gets a clearer understanding of 
the problem, and the customer is exposed to and becomes more familiar and comfortable 
with new technologies that may provide novel but effective solutions. 
Relationship between unity of customer voice and problem/solution understanding 
The positive relationship between problem understanding and singular voice of 
the customer was also expected.  The observed effect is even larger, and of a higher 
statistical power, than for customer engagement.  Customers who exhibit a “single voice” 
should be easier to comprehend.  Further, having a single voice works in both directions.  
The customer’s explanation of the problem will naturally be clearer, but so will the 
feedback provided by the customer on any proposed solutions. 
Relationship between customer engagement and unity of customer voice 
A positive significant relationship was shown to exist between customer 
engagement and voice of the customer, which was not as expected.  The hypothesized 
relationship was negative, the rationale being that as the level of engagement increased, 
the potential for different customer perspectives being expressed would increase.  
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Arguably counterintuitive, this relationship may in fact be understood by considering 
situations at each extreme. 
At low levels of customer engagement, it is conceivable that multiple perspectives 
of the problem experience are still being expressed.  The fact that the problems worked 
under CP-3 are chronic would likely mean that there are numerous examples available 
where the problem manifests itself; conversely, if there were few documented examples 
of the given problem, it would be unlikely to ever be worked under CP-3 (or, in the 
general case, with resources commensurate with solving a chronic customer problem).  
With limited customer perspectives available, there could understandably be fewer 
opportunities to ask questions.  These examples would be difficult to assess; they could 
be anomalies, or the underlying core issue may be too deeply masked to be discovered. 
Higher levels of customer engagement, conversely, may provide the technologists 
with more opportunity to discuss those documented examples with the users.  True 
anomalies would be identified and dismissed, improving overall confidence in the 
understanding of the incumbent technology and the operational environment.  
Additionally, more customer engagement may result in even more examples being 
brought to light; this increase in data points may thus serve to more readily reveal 
patterns.  These patterns would provide evidence of those underlying issues, thus making 
the true nature of the (possibly unarticulated) true need more apparent.   
Finally, the observed partial correlations, which were also unexpected, may 
provide a case for the theoretical basis of any causality between customer engagement 
and customer voice.  It may be that customers who did speak with a single voice were 
inherently more engaged for the same reasons they were more likely to speak with that 
54 
 
single voice.  It is conceivable that the most engaged customers were highly specialized 
groups that largely worked together.  Such a group would likely present a consistent face 
to outside bodies, particularly when discussing the group’s mission.  Conversely, with 
customers that come from a wide range of experiences, it may be difficult to find any one 
customer willing to engage deeply.  Additionally, involving a broader customer base 
would limit the amount of time available for specific individuals to interact. 
This may be, however, only an interesting distraction from the more compelling 
observation that the relationship in fact appears to be positive.  This would suggest, at 
least arguably, that there is no basis for any curvilinear relationship with customer 
engagement.  In other words, for these limited-duration projects focused on a specific 
technical problem, there is no evidence that engaging the customer necessarily leads to a 
more confused relationship between customer and technologist.  There is perhaps a 
danger in something of a “Stockholm Syndrome” manifesting itself, that is, the 
technologists being so tightly coupled with the customer that they lose their outsider’s 
perspective.  This should, however, be of little concern so long as the project is of some 
finite length and the same technologists are not participating on every team. 
In short, there is little downside to involving the customer in the solution 
development process.  At least for relatively small teams who focus their attention on a 
single customer need, keeping that customer engaged as the solution evolves may serve 
to help the voice of the customer converge rather than diverge. With no evidence in this 
admittedly small sample of the hypothesized curvilinear relationship, innovative 
problem-solving teams appear to benefit considerably from highly engaged customers. 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The positive effect of customer engagement on problem understanding is clearly 
demonstrated.  At least in the context of CP-3 projects, which are closed-ended and 
focused on a specific user need, it appears that “more is better” when it comes to seeking 
user perspective.  Information relative to the context, inherently difficult to clearly 
express verbally, is key to understanding and appreciating the implications of the trade-
offs required.  The information required to address needs in an innovative manner resides 
both with the user and the technologist.  As this and much previous research shows, such 
tacit information is best communicated through direct associations between the 
individuals in possession of the information. 
 
Research Insights 
Don’t hesitate to get as close to the end-user as possible. 
The data suggest there is little reason (competitive concerns or secrecy issues 
aside) to limit customer involvement in these short-term, focused, problem-solving 
teams.  Users can indeed become the innovators themselves, as von Hippel (1986) has 
well documented, but they are not always in the position to make physical changes to 
hardware, even if they possess the all traits of user-innovators; indeed, many systems, 
such as today’s ubiquitous consumer electronics, are designed so that modification is not 
possible.  Further, particularly in large, bureaucratic systems (such as, but by no means 
limited to, the U.S. military), changing the configuration of a system or procuring an 
entirely new system may be a highly regulated, frustratingly conservative processes. 
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Likewise, potential solutions to any need must be recognized and understood by 
the customer.  Even a user who may otherwise be highly motivated to adopt an 
innovative solution will often be unaware of potential cutting-edge technologies or of 
technologies and approaches that have not previously been applied to their specific need.  
Adoption of any change beyond an incremental improvement in performance to the 
incumbent system requires that the customer first be able to view the situation from a 
different – and unfamiliar – perspective. 
These CP-3 projects are well-structured to bring together both elements of the 
innovating user.  The customer contributes the tacit knowledge of the operational 
environment and insight into the trade-offs associated with any potential change in the 
status quo. The technologist brings a fresh perspective as well as the knowledge of other 
potential substitute technologies.  Such a team may well be able to function as a virtual 
user-innovator. 
Approach the problem-solving process as close to “ethnography” as practical. 
 The starting point for any attempt to solve a problem or address an unmet need 
should be “a day in the life” of the end-user.  This can be key to enhancing the 
technologists’ understanding of the problem and, more to the point, the trade-offs 
involved in any change from the status quo.  This immersion need not be carried out to 
the degree in which, say, journalists are embedded with deployed military units.  Rather, 
it can be accomplished largely through face-to-face discussions with actual users, 
observing the incumbent system in operation, and being directly involved in the field 
tests to see not just the performance of the potential solution but the reaction of the users 
as well.  Even for technologies that are inherently – and intentionally – dangerous, this 
57 
 
can be accomplished without “standing in harm’s way” by keeping the technologists safe 
and not compromising the mission. 
Provide all technologists opportunities to participate in these teams. 
Rather than “round up the usual suspects” each time a need is examined, 
organizations should seek to immerse as many researchers as possible into such problem-
solution teams at some point in their careers.  Simply relying on a standing cadre to man 
these teams will lead to them becoming intermediaries and effectively limiting the 
transfer of “sticky” information.  In any firm that prides itself on its innovative culture, 
having employees who are not only creative but intimately knowledgeable about the 
customer can be a tremendous corporate resource.  Any and all insight gained by the 
researchers into the true nature of customer needs should endure and provide a positive 
influence in all future work, with that customer and with others.  Finally, increasing the 
number of people engaging with customers will logically increase the likelihood of some 
novel and effective solution emerging for any given need. 
While there may be inefficiencies inherent in establishing a separate process 
dedicated to consumer insight, the true value to the organization is in exposing 
technologists to the operational environment of technologies with which they are both 
familiar and unfamiliar.  Particularly in large, bureaucratic firms, where a drive for 
efficiency is more likely to lead to specialization, researchers may be isolated from not 
only the users but other stakeholders who must be convinced of the merits and the 
potential of the technologies proposed.  As of this writing, the U.S. Air Force Research 
Laboratory (AFRL) has pulled back its representatives co-located with the Major 
Commands (MAJCOM) in the name of efficiency.  While these representatives provided 
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great insight into the operational customer needs, the cost to AFRL was deemed 
excessive relative to the value added.  As ad hoc teams are even more resource-intensive 
than an individual charged with customer interaction, it is easy to envision even fewer 
opportunities for direct interaction between users and researchers.  Such retrenchment by 
a firm into its core competencies is not unique to the Air Force, and the unfortunate end 
result is all too often “core rigidities” leaving the firm more focused on producing 
excellent products and less on what products their customers really need (Leonard-
Barton, 1992). 
Accept short-term setbacks. 
The end-user should remain the focus of the team’s efforts regardless of how 
many other “customers” exist.  However, multiple stakeholders should be expected in any 
seemingly intractable problem.  Actually solving the problem will often require changes 
that are outside the authority of the user to make.  Trade-offs will inevitably be necessary, 
but mitigating circumstances may often preclude the adoption of the “best” solution at all.  
The true value, then, of assembling such a problem-solving team may not be solving the 
specific problem at hand; instead, it may simply be a more sound understanding of the 
customer.  Solutions to other unmet needs, both existing and future, may then be 
addressed even more effectively. 
 
Limitations of the Research 
 As previously stated, this research covered a large portion of a very small and 
very homogenous population.  It was aimed at a very specific set of projects to 
intentionally limit the influence of as many environmental factors as possible.  As such, 
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external validity should not necessarily be presumed.  Rather than simply increasing 
customer engagement in all new product developments, the reader should consider the 
employment of the short-term, focused teams to address specific customers and their 
needs. 
 It was stated previously, but an important caveat is that the involvement of the 
customer in many circumstances will be limited in reality by economic and competitive 
factors.  The need to keep trade secrets and other proprietary information out of the hands 
of even the most loyal customers may preclude customer involvement entirely.  
Similarly, military users may be unable to present the complete operational context of a 
system to anyone without proper clearance. 
 
Future Research 
Track assessments of problem understanding as a function of time. 
 These focused problem-solving teams are not without cost, both in direct expense 
as well as the opportunity costs lost when these very talented and creative employees are 
not working on something else.  If some inflection point exists, where problem 
understanding begins to increase at a lower rate with respect to an increase in customer 
involvement, it could be considered a possible decision point in the timing of resource 
allocation for these teams.  Further, it may be of interest to product developers whether or 
not the team’s perception of their understanding of the user’s problem varies as the 
problem-solving process is carried out.  Specifically, does it linearly increase, is there 
some inflection point, are there points where it decreases, or are there other 
discontinuities in the level of understanding attained?  Does the “voice of the customer” 
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converge, diverge, or remain consistent throughout the project?  Are any of these 
potentially predictable? 
Compare and contrast users’ perceptions of interaction with that of the technologists. 
 A decision was made in this research to not attempt to gauge the views of the end-
users due to a number of practical reasons.  Additionally, as previously noted, self-
reported measures are not always reliable and can be skewed towards either positive or 
negative perceptions.  Using similar techniques to assess the users’ perception as to how 
well they feel the technologists understand their problems could help ascertain whether or 
not there tends to be general agreement with the self-assessment of the technologists. 
Reassess the level of discontinuity of the proposed solutions. 
While this research found no observed limit to the positive effect of customer 
involvement, the self-reported measure of the level of innovation, as the degree of 
comfort the customer felt with a given solution, was found to be difficult to assess.  A 
more rigorous assessment of the degree of change the proposed solution requires could be 
correlated to the specific project team’s assessment of problem understanding.  This 
would more fully investigate the “leap of faith” that users are willing to accept. 
 
Summary 
 When economic and practical considerations permit, the use of a focused, 
problem-solving team of the model in the U.S. Air Force CP-3 program can provide 
technologists with greater insight into persistent, acute user problems and otherwise 
unarticulated needs.  The close relationship between the technologists and the user is key 
to the adequate exchange of pertinent latent information in both directions:  the nuances 
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of the operational environment by the user to the technologist, and the capabilities of new 
technologies from the technologists to the user.  The positive effect of customer 
engagement on problem understanding under such a project appears to be significant. 
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